Surely they don't need backdoors when they can just exploit the awful network security that American networking equipment vendors already come with out of the box?
The US needed to smuggle Stuxnet in, but with networking equipment there's a treasure trove of shitty practices. Cisco and Juniper have been caught hiding hard-coded password how many times now?
>> Surely they don't need backdoors when they can just exploit the awful network security that American networking equipment vendors already come with out of the box?
For Cisco they literally keep doing it year after year. They are like the Boeing of the IT world. Its unbelievable how they are still in business and growing...and then people worry about Mythos… :-))
Cisco your core vendor...this is way the CEO earns the big bucks...
2010 (CVE-2010-1574): Cisco IE3000 switches shipped with hard-coded SNMP community names public and private.
2017 (CVE-2017-3834): Cisco Aironet 1830/1850 Mobility Express had default credentials that could let an unauthenticated remote attacker take control of the device.
2017 (CVE-2017-6689): Cisco Elastic Services Controller had a default weak hard-coded password for the admin user in the ConfD CLI.
2017 (CVE-2017-12317): Cisco AMP for Endpoints used a static key to protect the connector password
2018 (CVE-2018-0141): Cisco Prime Collaboration Provisioning 11.6 had a hard-coded SSH account password that could allow local access to the underlying Linux OS.
2018 (CVE-2018-0150): Cisco IOS XE had an undocumented privilege-15 account with a default username and password, allowing unauthenticated remote administrative access.
2018 (CVE-2018-15389): Cisco Prime Collaboration Provisioning’s install flow could leave a default hard-coded web admin username/password in place.
2019 (Cisco advisory; credential issue documented in the advisory): Cisco Small Business RV160/RV260/RV340 firmware images were found to contain undocumented accounts and hardcoded password hashes
2021 (CVE-2021-34795): Cisco Catalyst PON ONT devices had a default Telnet credential vulnerability when Telnet was enabled.
2021 (CVE-2021-34757 / CVE-2021-34744): Cisco Business 220 Smart Switches had a static-password issue and a static-key issue
2023 (CVE-2023-20101): Cisco Emergency Responder shipped with static root credentials that could not be changed or deleted, enabling unauthenticated remote login.
2024 (CVE-2024-20412): Cisco Firepower Threat Defense for Firepower 1000/2100/3100/4200 had static accounts with hard-coded passwords
And Juniper? And Fortinet ? Yeap...Our CEOs earn big bucks too...
- Juniper
2015 (CVE-2015-7755 / CVE-2015-7756): Juniper disclosed unauthorized code in ScreenOS that enabled unauthorized remote administrative access and, separately, VPN traffic decryption on affected versions.
2017 (CVE-2017-2343): Juniper SRX Integrated UserFW had hardcoded credentials in its authentication API.
2019 (CVE-2019-0020): Juniper ATP shipped with hard-coded credentials in the Web Collector instance.
2019 (CVE-2019-0030): Juniper ATP used DES with a hardcoded salt for password hashing
- Fortinet
2016 (CVE-2016-1909): FortiOS, FortiAnalyzer, FortiSwitch, and FortiCache had an undocumented Fortimanager_Access account with a hardcoded SSH passphrase.
2019 (CVE-2019-6698): FortiRecorder set a hardcoded admin password on managed FortiCameras.
2019 (CVE-2019-6693): FortiOS / FortiManager / FortiAnalyzer used a hard-coded cryptographic key for sensitive config data
2020 (CVE-2019-16153): FortiSIEM had hard-coded PostgreSQL credentials in its database component.
Did you mean to include the Juniper CVE's? In my experience, all vendors are constantly remediating CVE's. I wonder if Cisco has the most vulnerabilities discovered because they also have the most users, largest product offering, highest inventory, etc?
I've had a hell of a time patching Palo Alto's and Fortigates, too. Critical CVEs, day-one RCE attacks. It seems more profitable to rush out new code / new products, and just address vulns as they appear, rather than spending extra development time hardening the software.
At this point, any US company's products on software and hardware side can be safely considered an espionage asset. Even ignoring well known things like intercepting international packages during transit and putting malware into them.
Same goes obviously for ie Chinese stuff, but I don't think you guys realize how for outsider the border between China and US in terms of morality is practically non-existent now. I don't mean it in any snarky way, just looking at facts.
Also, China doesn't invade countries half around the world and bring them to utter destruction and misery for generations to come, killing thousands to millions of civilians and creating breeding grounds for things like ISIS. They do their own thing, quietly and patiently, with laser focus and for outsiders its at most 'not great not terrible' category.
If the US tried their own belt and road people would be screaming about "imperialism/colonialism/white privilege"... thing's aren't as cut and dried as US evil and "oh shucks that clever Chinese government, not great but not terrible"
American "belt & road" has been tried, but in a neoliberal way, through WB and IMF, and it has been an utter failure (see Joe Stiglitz or Ha-Joon Chang for examples). Chinese are way more pragmatic (smarter) about it.
> Also, China doesn't invade countries half around the world and bring them to utter destruction and misery for generations to come, killing thousands to millions of civilians and creating breeding grounds for things like ISIS. They do their own thing, quietly and patiently, with laser focus and for outsiders its at most 'not great not terrible' category.
Here are a list of things that definitely don't fall under 'not great not terrible' category:
Great Leap Forward - estimated 15 million to 55 million people death
Leaders of countries which want to do business with China, most countries in the world, have to talk only very quietly about these "sensitive issues", or better not mention them at all.
Iran clearly has tech/network/hacking capability, while also having unprecidented authority to just do ANYTHING while they do a litteral strategic reboot.
Given that Russia and China,(others) are interested in closeing "bugdoors" as well, it is likely that new network systems and protocals will be imposed by these countrys.
Which is why banning chinese routers and banning chinese cars than can be remotely disabled by the komrades makes sense.
Selling cars, worldwide, made sense when they weren't always connected to the mother land. Germans selling you a BMW in the 80s? You've got the key: you turn the key. They couldn't turn off all the BMWs if suddenly the US were to be at war with Germany again.
But this madness of cars receiving OTA updates and remote subscriptions and whatnots?
The era of "smart cars" actually makes targeting much easier. You don't need to bulk disable cars in a country.
Imagine an enemy country using zero-days to track a military leader via their personal device(s), then disabling their smart civilian vehicle they use to commute to work. Final leg is they had previously parked drones along their expected commute routes for just such an occasion and..
I presume the very basic safety requirement for any VIP person in the future will be fully offline car, with updates only done at certified secured service, or simply not done since the car just keeps working. Something along melting chip of 5g/whatever antenna or ripping out whole comm box.
Ah, think about it, the luxury of owning your own car, you and only you. I can almost imagine it. The future, its bright.
If you bought a BMW in the 80s and you were suddenly at war with Germany, you'd be stuck scavenging for replacement parts the moment something in the engine failed. It's not as easy and direct, but the problem is still there.
Doing business with the enemy always comes with a risk. For countries that don't build their own networking equipment (including the PCBs and chips), you have to accept some level of risk or you have to avoid such technology all together.
Indeed, though we are also finding out how bad it is to not have any local competition in many fields of hardware, software, and manufacturing.
Heavily sanctioned countries like Afghanistan and Iran have one thing going for them, and that's that they can't easily build a dependence on foreign technology (though not having such technology at all is arguably just as bad).
The average time before a car NEEDS a replacement part to run must be at least a few years. That's a different situation from flipping a switch to turn all connected cars off.
But why do have all these Intel ME, AMD PSP and ARM TrustZone / Secure Bootloader backdoors in all but RISC-V CPU's now, when they have to reboot poor stupid Jupiter, Cisco, Fortinet, and MikroTik devices? Oh, that's for the real enemies, the socialists. The ones with workers rights.
The US needed to smuggle Stuxnet in, but with networking equipment there's a treasure trove of shitty practices. Cisco and Juniper have been caught hiding hard-coded password how many times now?
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